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The Resistance of Contingency : The Particular, the Irretrievable, 
and the Law in Villon’s Testament 
 
 
Abstract: Studies of law in the Testament have tended to adopt one of two approaches. 
Archæological studies have identified the judicial motifs, institutions, and figures to which 
Villon alludes, while formalist studies have focused on the ways in which Villon assimilates 
these elements to a poetic reflection that ultimately transforms them. I take a contrasting 
approach to investigate the role played by contingency, focusing on two issues. The first of 
these is the relationship between the particular and the global in different respects: the 
constant undermining of the testator’s exemplary status, the dubious relevance of proverbial 
discourse, the manipulation of formal principles. The second is the difficulty of recuperating 
“facts” that might serve as admissible evidence within the poem’s fictive world: the fragility 
of both individual and collective memory, the opaque character of allusions, the theme of 
variation that calls the text’s integrity into question. 
 
Résumé : La recherche sur le droit dans le Testament a adopté deux démarches principales : 
l’une, quasi archéologique, consiste à identifier les motifs, institutions et personnages 
judiciaires auxquels Villon fait allusion ; l’autre, formaliste, se concentre sur la manière dont 
Villon intègre ces motifs, institutions et personnages à une réflexion poétique qui finit par les 
détourner. Adoptant une approche sensiblement différente, nous nous interrogeons sur le rôle 
des contingences en la matière. Nous axons notre étude sur deux questions : la relation entre 
le particulier et le global à différents égards (exemplarité constamment minée du « testateur 
», pertinence douteuse du discours proverbial, détournement de principes formels), et la 
difficulté de récupérer des « faits » recevables dans l’univers fictif du poème (fragilité de la 
mémoire individuelle et collective, opacité des allusions, thème de la variance qui laisse 
planer le doute sur l’intégrité du texte). 
 
 
Theorizing contingency and the law in Villon 
As befits a satirical will drawn up by a poet with underworld affiliations, the 
language and institutions of law loom large in the Testament. Two approaches have 
dominated studies of the poem’s legal dimensions. The longer-standing approach, 
which we might call “archæological”, involves identifying the motifs, institutions, 
and figures to which Villon alludes. Pierre Champion, for instance, laid the 
groundwork for many subsequent analyses by revealing the Parisian police officers 
behind names such as Jean Raguier and Michault du Four.1 More prominent in 
recent decades is a “formalist” approach, which takes account of the findings of 
                                                
1 P. Champion, François Villon, sa vie et son temps, 2 vols, Paris, Champion, 1913, II, p. 307-
308, 336-337. These figures are mentioned in l. 1070 and 1079 of the Testament; all 
references to Villon’s work are to François Villon, Lais, Testament, Poésies diverses, avec 




archæological studies but accentuates their poetic rather than documentary value. 
Nancy Freeman Regalado’s work, on the aesthetic effects of names and ostensibly 
referential details, is perhaps the best example.2 Both these strands of research 
depend upon interpreting specific references. In what follows I consider the 
Testament’s legal resonances not on the level of allusions but on that of poetic 
structures and techniques, re-evaluating the poem’s relationship to the law by 
examining the important role of contingency. On the one hand, contingency 
pervades and problematizes different kinds of relationships between the particular 
and the global. The exemplary status of the testator, the relevance of proverbial 
discourse, the use of established formal and compositional principles: all are called 
into question. On the other hand, the poem’s fictive world is emphatically 
contingent: individual and collective memory are fragile, allusions are opaque, and 
the text’s very integrity is open to question. Hence it is difficult to establish “facts” 
that might serve as admissible evidence for any judgement of the testator. In both 
respects contingency is a form of resistance to law, and a principle at the heart of 
Villon’s work. 
I understand “contingency” in its medieval philosophical sense, notably as 
Boethius conveyed and reshaped the concept from Aristotle: the capacity of 
something to be otherwise than it is.3 Framed in this way, contingency is relevant to 
the law in two ways, which correspond to the two axes explored below and which 
might usefully be termed “particularity” and “retrievability”. Particularity concerns 
the question of how particulars and universals relate to each other, a vexed issue in 
ancient and medieval philosophy.4 The relationship between legal principles and 
individual cases can justifiably be considered in terms of the particulars-universals 
question. Principles and cases stand in a synecdochic relation to each other: a case 
manifests and encapsulates the principle according to which it is judged. The precise 
nature of that synecdoche, the relative authority of the principle and the case, 
inevitably varies from one legal (and philosophical) system to another. Yet, 
whatever the systemic context may be, the relationship between cases and principles 
also involves a tension between contingency and necessity, between the chance 
empirical occurrence and the transcendent validity of a norm. The more contingent 
the case – the more it appears random and sui generis –, the more vexed its 
relationship to the principle.5 Particularity is thus a kind of contingency that resists, 
or at least complicates, attempts to assimilate it to some higher or more general 
category. Retrievability, by contrast, pertains to the nature of proof. The more 
contingent a witness’s allegation or a piece of material evidence – the more 
                                                
2 See especially N. F. Regalado, “La Fonction poétique des noms propres dans le Testament 
de François Villon”, Cahiers de l’Association Internationale d’Études Françaises, 32, 1980, 
p. 51-68 ; ead., “Effet de réel, Effet du réel: Representation and Reference in Villon’s 
Testament”, Yale French Studies, 70, 1986, p. 63-77. 
3 See the excellent overview in D. Heller-Roazen, Fortune’s Faces: The Roman de la Rose 
and the Poetics of Contingency, Baltimore/London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, 
p. 1-29. 
4 A. de Libera, La Querelle des universaux de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge, Paris, Seuil, 
1996. 
5 Hence the English legal adage “hard cases make bad law”. 
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vulnerable it is to refutation in the absence of independent corroboration –, the less 
reliable its status as proof. This kind of contingency, and its negligible evidentiary 
value, are signalled in the venerable legal axiom of Biblical origin testis unus, testis 
nullus, on which Villon famously plays himself.6 Particularity and retrievability shed 
new light on disparate aspects of the Testament that various scholars have noted, but 
that have not previously been thought to have legal implications. Indeed, these 
perspectives on Villon’s art offer new ways of thinking about law, in a very broad 
sense, in the wider poetic culture of the period: as an issue relevant not only to 
authors’ ideological stances but also to their compositional technique and 
engagement with audience expectations. 
 
Particularity: the problematizing of exemplarity 
Of the various manifestations of particularity in the Testament, the clearest is 
doubtless Villon’s persona: the testator, as he has come to be conventionally 
designated in English-language scholarship. This figure contrasts with the first-
person voices in the stanzaic didactic poetry of the preceding generations, the poetry 
against which the Testament demands to be read and alongside which it was 
occasionally transmitted in manuscripts.7 In the work of Alain Chartier, Michault 
Taillevent, and Pierre Chastellain, the poetic persona or acteur may be quite strongly 
individualized, and may have a vexed relationship to his assumed audience, but he 
always has some kind of representative function. Whether the anxious narrator of 
Taillevent’s Passe Temps who regrets his imprudent youth as old age threatens, or 
Chastellain’s more idiosyncratic voice who offers an explicit counter-argument to 
Taillevent in the Temps Perdu, these acteurs consistently express a discourse that a 
wider community already uses, recognizes, or might be hoped to espouse.8 In other 
words, there is a predictably synecdochic relationship between the case and the 
principle, the persona and the community’s values. No such predictability marks 
Villon’s testator. He sporadically adopts positions that recall those of more 
                                                
6 “Ce jura il sur son coullon” (l. 2002), punning on the Latin term testis. The axiom itself was 
diversely interpreted by medieval jurists: see, for instance, A. Gouron, “Testis unus, testis 
nullus dans la doctrine juridique du XIIe siècle”, Mediæval Antiquity, ed. A. Welkenhuysen, 
H. Braet and W. Verbeke, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1995, p. 83-93. 
7 On the transmission of Villon’s poetry, see Mühlethaler and Hicks, ed. cit., p. 26-30; 
A. Armstrong, “The Testament of François Villon”, The Cambridge Companion to Medieval 
French Literature, ed. S. Gaunt and S. Kay, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
p. 65-76 (p. 73-74). 
8 R. Deschaux, Un poète bourguignon du XVe siècle: Michault Taillevent (Édition et Étude), 
Geneva, Droz, 1975, p. 131-163; Pierre Chastellain and Vaillant, Les Œuvres de Pierre 
Chastellain et de Vaillant, poètes du XVe siècle, ed. R. Deschaux, Geneva, Droz, 1982, p. 17-
41. On the acteurs in the Passe Temps and Temps Perdu, see J.-Cl. Mühlethaler, Poétiques du 
XVe siècle: Situation de François Villon et de Michault Taillevent, Paris, Nizet, 1983, p. 165, 
174; A. Bloem, “‘Si jeunesse savait, si vieillesse pouvait’: une analyse de la personnalité 
poétique de Michault Taillevent dans son Passe Temps”, Le Moyen Français, 57-58, 2005-
2006, p. 11-25; A. Armstrong, The Virtuoso Circle: Competition, Collaboration and 
Complexity in Late Medieval French Poetry, Tempe AZ, Arizona Center for Medieval and 




traditional acteurs – moral commentator, frustrated lover, and the like – but, as has 
often been noted, he is not a consistent persona. Rather, he assumes a succession of 
roles that are recognizable in themselves but that are incompatible within a single 
voice.9 Crucially, the testator expresses awareness of his performance: 
 
De viel porte voix et le ton, 
Et ne suis q’un jeune cocquart (l. 735-6). 
 
These lines signal explicitly that the testator is both himself and not himself, 
constantly otherwise than he is; in short, a classic figure of contingency.10 There is 
no way in which his ever-changing performances can be unified into a self-identical 
whole, other than perhaps as a kind of personification of contingency itself. 
Particularity is at stake, for the lack of coherence at the level of the individual case 
prevents us from establishing a stable relationship between that case and any larger 
principle. Put another way: we can’t regard the testator as exemplary if we can’t tell 
what he’s exemplary of. 
The exemplarity of the personas in the Passe Temps and Temps Perdu is 
partly secured through rhetorical means. Through the technique of epiphonema, the 
systematic use of proverbial expressions to close stanzas, Taillevent and Chastellain 
embed their acteurs’ voices in a long-standing collective wisdom. Once again the 
personas serve as synecdochic cases, embodying and transmitting the moral 
principles of the larger community.11 Not that the process is seamless. The proverbs 
in the Temps Perdu tend to crystallize its challenge to the Passe Temps, while 
Chastellain’s subsequent Temps Recouvré tacitly questions the very validity of 
proverbial discourse by showing that it can all too easily be deployed to support 
opposing stances in an argument.12 In the Testament, however, proverbial doxa is 
contested much more pervasively and radically. Whether they are expressions of 
folk wisdom or tags from auctoritates, sententious formulations are comically 
distorted, provocatively juxtaposed, and set in incongruous contexts that encourage 
ironic readings.13 Significantly, this is not a matter of programmatic inversion, as we 
see in Rabelais when the young Gargantua acts contrary to a body of proverbs, or in 
“joyous” cultural productions of the late medieval Netherlands that express 
                                                
9 See, for example, J. H. M. Taylor, The Poetry of François Villon: Text and Context, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 33-57 ; Armstrong, “The Testament”, art. 
cit., p. 64-65. 
10 Heller-Roazen, Fortune’s Faces, op. cit., p. 136 considers Faux Semblant in the Roman de 
la Rose in the same light. 
11 See Armstrong, The Virtuoso Circle, op. cit., p. 57-58, 63; Mühlethaler, Poétiques du XVe 
siècle, op. cit., p. 67-83, 88-95; E. Rassart-Eeckhout, “La Mécanique proverbiale: 
l’épiphonème dans Le Passe temps de Michault Taillevent”, “A l’heure encore de mon 
escrire”: Aspects de la littérature de Bourgogne sous Philippe le Bon et Charles le 
Téméraire, ed. Cl. Thiry, Les Lettres Romanes, numéro spécial, 1997, p. 147-161; Taylor, The 
Poetry of François Villon, op. cit., p. 15-16. 
12 Armstrong, The Virtuoso Circle, op. cit., p. 67. 
13 Examples are discussed in T. Hunt, Villon’s Last Will: Language and Authority in the 
Testament, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 91. 
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emerging bourgeois values as the unstated mirror-image of carnivalesque excess.14 
In such cases the inverted principles remain intact, while those who transgress them 
reveal their inadequacy. The Testament, by contrast, calls into question the body of 
maxims itself: its self-consistency as a corpus, the stability of individual 
formulations, and the adequacy of those formulations to particular cases. If the 
protean testator demonstrates the particularity of the case, the instability of 
proverbial discourse suggests that the principle is no less contingent. 
Disjunction between case and principle is also apparent in respect of poetic 
form and structure. Villon scholars have drawn attention to ways in which the 
Testament pushes at formal boundaries on different levels. At the level of “macro-
structure” the testamentary form, familiar from amatory and satirical poetry, 
provides a much less systematic framework than usual.15 Bequests and testamentary 
dispositions have no overwhelming predominance, for they are significantly delayed 
by the testator’s opening reflections on death and poverty. Nor do they follow the 
regular pattern apparent in most stanzaic poems of this kind: Villon varies the length 
of each item, sometimes by inserting fixed-form lyrics, rather than devoting a single 
stanza to each bequest or disposition. More innovative than his own previous 
exercise in the form, the Lais, these practices can be illuminatingly compared with 
those of his predecessor Pierre de Hauteville. An attested intertext for the Lais and 
Testament, which it accompanies in one manuscript (Arsenal 3523), Hauteville’s 
Confession et Testament de l’amant trespassé de deuil extends the parameters of the 
poetic will, but does so rather less radically than the Testament.16 As its title partially 
indicates, Hauteville’s composition combines different organizational schemata: the 
confession (l. 1-726), which itself includes a debate between the poetic persona and 
a priest (l. 493-714); the will (l. 727-1392); and the ars moriendi (l. 1393-1626).17 
Bequests and dispositions in the Confession et Testament, then, form discrete parts 
of a larger whole: the will lays no claim to the whole text. In Villon’s Testament, by 
contrast, the very first huitain specifies the testator’s age and mental health. These 
nods to legal conventions, however oblique – “[E]n l’an de mon trentïesme aage” 
(l. 1), “Ne du tout fol ne du tout saige” (l. 3) – set the poem in a clear testamentary 
framework from the outset. Yet that framework is immediately disrupted, as 
invective against Thibaut d’Aussigny famously pulls the testator’s opening sentence 
apart (l. 6-8); and in a sense it is never fully reassembled, for themes, voices, and 
registers continue to proliferate. The idiosyncrasy exhibited by the Testament’s 
                                                
14 See François Rabelais, Gargantua, ed. R. Calder and M. A. Screech, Geneva/Paris, 
Droz/Minard, 1970, p. 79-81; H. Pleij, Het gilde van de Blauwe Schuit: literatuur, volksfeest 
en burgermoraal in de late middeleeuwen, Amsterdam, Meulenhoff, 1983, p. 241-242. 
15 Perspectives on the testamentary tradition, and Villon’s place within it, include W. H. Rice, 
The European Ancestry of Villon’s Satirical Testaments, New York, The Corporate Press, 
1941; A. J. A. van Zoest, Structures de deux testaments fictionnels: Le Lais et le Testament de 
François Villon, The Hague/Paris, Mouton, 1974; V. R. Rossman, François Villon: les 
concepts médiévaux du testament, Paris, Jean-Pierre Delarge, 1976. 
16 Pierre de Hauteville, La Confession et Testament de l’amant trespassé de deuil, ed. 
R. M. Bidler, Montreal, CERES, 1982. See Rice, The European Ancestry, op. cit., p. 197-207; 
Taylor, The Poetry of François Villon, op. cit., p. 19-21. 




global structure is also evident at lower levels of composition. Considered against 
traditions and practices of lyric insertion, the relationship between fixed-form lyrics 
and huitains is unusual: neither the discursive function of the ballades and 
rondeaux, nor the voice that ostensibly delivers them, nor even their versification are 
systematically contrasted with the “host” structure in the ways that we might 
expect.18 Even the relationship between language and metre is much less predictable 
than usual in poetry of this period.19 All these interrelated manifestations of poetic 
originality take on a new value when considered from the perspective of 
particularity. They make the Testament into a case that does not satisfactorily 
exemplify any generic model. It is, and yet it isn’t, a didactic dit, a satirical will, and 
so forth. This has particular implications for the poem’s audience, for Villon’s 
readers are not provided with clear categories or horizons that might shape their 
responses. In short, it’s impossible to tell what the Testament is a case of, what sort 
of poem it is. 
 
Retrievability: the uncertainties of memory and transmission 
A further set of challenges to the audience concerns our ability to establish a 
coherent picture of the testator’s world on the basis of what he tells us. Key 
techniques in the Testament tend to block the process of “consistency-building”, 
which reception theorists have suggested is a fundamental operation of reading.20 
The facts of the case, which depend on the retrievability of the poem’s fictive world, 
are distinctly uncertain. One major obstacle to retrievability lies in the limitations of 
memory, whether individual or collective, within that world. Most crucially, the 
testator – through whose perceptions and language, of course, almost everything in 
the Testament is filtered – cannot be trusted to recall details correctly.21 His tendency 
to misremember ostensibly notable figures from history and legend, and to misquote 
texts that we might expect a university-educated man to know well, have become 
critical commonplaces.22 Among other things, this propensity characterizes the 
                                                
18 See Armstrong, “The Testament”, art. cit., p. 70-73; A. Armstrong and S. Kay, Knowing 
Poetry: Verse in Medieval France from the Rose to the Rhétoriqueurs, Ithaca/London, Cornell 
University Press, 2011, p. 159-160. 
19 See R. Pensom, “La Magie de la métrique dans le Testament de Villon”, Romania, 114, 
1996, p. 182-202; id., Le Sens de la métrique chez François Villon: Le Testament, Berne, 
Peter Lang, 2004. 
20 See especially W. Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response, Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 107-134. 
21 The exception to what narratologists would term the Testament’s internal focalization is the 
ballade de conclusion (l. 1996-2023), which compounds the pervasive uncertainty by 
reframing the testator within the perceptions of the ballade’s unidentified speaker. That 
speaker’s knowledge of “povre Villon” (l. 1997) is explicitly presented as limited and 
subjective: “je croy bien que pas n’en ment” (l. 2004). 
22 Taylor, The Poetry of François Villon, op. cit., p. 73; Armstrong, “The Testament”, art. cit., 
p. 70 ; N. F. Regalado, “Villon’s Legacy from Le Testament of Jean de Meun: Misquotation, 
Memory, and the Wisdom of Fools”, Villon at Oxford: The Drama of the Text. Proceedings of 
the Conference Held at St Hilda’s College Oxford, March 1996, ed. M. J. Freeman and 
J. H. M. Taylor, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1999, p. 282-311. 
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testator as a wise fool, hence anything but a source of reliable testimony.23 Even 
where he refers explicitly to his memory of past events, the context is marked by 
opacity or distortion. One of his allusions to Thibaut d’Aussigny is a case in point: 
Dieu mercy… et Tacque Thibault, 
Qui tant d’eaue froide m’a fait boire 
En ung bas, non pas en ung hault, 
Mengier d’angoisse mainte poire, 
Enferré… Quant j’en ay mémoire, 
Je prie pour luy et relicqua 
Que Dieu lui doint, et voire, voire, 
Ce que je pense, et cetera (l. 737-744). 
 
The testator’s recollection of imprisonment may be painfully clear, but his 
audience shares little of that clarity. Is the “eaue froide” an allusion to a prison diet, 
or to waterboarding? Is a poire d’angoisse purely metaphorical, or an instrument of 
judicial violence?24 And just what is the testator thinking that he’d like God to visit 
upon Thibaut? The Latin expressions intensify the effect, as unspecified 
supplements to something that isn’t specified in the first place. Just two stanzas 
later, a rather different memory is called up: 
 
Sy me souvient, ad mon advis, 
Que je feiz a mon partement 
Certains laiz, l’an cinquante six, 
Qu’aucuns, sans mon consentement, 
Voulurent nommer testament: 
Leur plaisir fut, non pas le myen (l. 753-758). 
 
What the testator remembers is a set of bequests, to be understood as Villon’s 
Lais, that has come to bear a misleading title. In light of the Testament’s 
thematization of textual instability, which I discuss below, these lines open up a 
disorientating possibility. The Lais that the testator recalls having written may be 
substantially different from the Lais that we may have read – different in ways that 
we cannot possibly identify.25 Hence the frequent failures of the testator’s memory 
are intensified by the occasional successes, in which the audience cannot adequately 
share. 
Other instances of remembering are similarly flawed. The Belle Heaulmière’s 
evocation of her past beauty (l. 493-508) is so ostentatiously a rhetorical exercise as 
to call its validity into question: we suspect that the expression of her memories, 
shaped as it is by established descriptive schemata, may not quite correspond to her 
                                                
23 Regalado, “Villon’s Legacy”, art. cit., p. 288. 
24 On the latter expression, see Le Testament Villon, ed. J. Rychner and A. Henry, 2 vols, 
Geneva, Droz, 1974, II, p. 111. 
25 Inevitably, the possibility is all the more disorientating for those who have previously read 
the Lais. The textual tradition indicates that the Testament’s early readers typically had access 




memories themselves.26 Collective memory is no more worthy of credence, as 
witness the testator’s attempts to solicit or shape his audience’s shared memories. 
The middle refrain in the sequence of three ballades on the ubi sunt theme, “Mais ou 
est le preux Charlemaigne?” (l. 364), might seem a classic rhetorical question: the 
well-worn didactic commonplace implies its own answer, that death has come even 
to such a universally admired figure as Charlemagne, as it will come to us all. Yet it 
is already clear, and becomes even clearer from one occurrence of this refrain to the 
next, that the testator is misremembering a great deal. His lapses, moreover, affect 
his audience, by stimulating memories of the relevant facts or texts.27 So, as the 
testator displays a sometimes comically limited knowledge of past rulers – the 
Scottish king whose birthmark alone is recalled, the king of Spain whose name 
escapes him (l. 365-371) – it becomes apparent to his increasingly self-conscious 
readers that historical memory is tenuous and arbitrary. How do we remember 
famous people? Do we remember the right things about them, and do we all 
remember the same things? Can we be confident that we’d do a better job than the 
testator? The refrain, then, turns out not to imply a single predictable answer after 
all. Where, indeed, is Charlemagne? Why was he “preux”, and how do we know? 
Questions of this kind eventually arise in respect of the testator himself, who devises 
his graveside inscription with an eye to establishing his image for posterity: 
 
Au moins sera de moy memoire 
Telle qu’elle est d’un bon follastre (l. 1882-1883). 
 
To be written in charcoal on plaster (l. 1880-1881), the inscription will not 
commemorate the testator for long; but even if it did, would it achieve the desired 
effect, and would that effect be appropriate? The Epitaphe and accompanying Verset 
(l. 1884-1903) can certainly be read as expressions of the folly and humour that 
mark a “follastre”, but their insistence on poverty and allusions to clerical 
degradation are at least as apparent as their wordplay and manipulation of register.28 
Equally, the inscription does not convey the testator’s important roles as martyr to 
love and moralist. In both reflecting the protean persona of the Testament and fixing 
its author’s posthumous reputation, it must be considered a failure. The testator’s 
appeals to collective memory ultimately draw attention to the precarity of that 
memory, and thereby to the contingency of any attitudes and understandings that 
may be based on it. 
We have seen that even when the testator appears able to recollect details of 
his experience, those details are not presented in a form that his audience can readily 
grasp. This gap between memories and their formulation reflects a more pervasive 
tendency in the Testament: expression often seems highly allusive, seems to gesture 
towards a sense that is not supplied in full. The key term here is “seems”, for we 
                                                
26 See Mühlethaler and Hicks, ed. cit., p. 225. The Belle Heaulmière is of course constructed 
and ventriloquized by the testator; however, her ontological status does not prevent us from 
ascribing thought and language to her, as to any other fictional character. 
27 Regalado, “Villon’s Legacy”, art. cit., p. 289-290. 
28 On the allusions in these lines, see Rychner and Henry, ed. cit., II, p. 263; Hunt, Villon’s 
Last Will, op. cit., p. 67; Taylor, The Poetry of François Villon, op. cit., p. 55. 
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must not assume that there is some pre-existing sense that the poem’s language 
imperfectly approximates. Rather, its language produces the effect of an unsupplied 
sense through semantic incompleteness: unable to make Villon’s formulations 
satisfactorily meaningful, readers are apt to assume that the missing elements lie 
somehow outside the text, whether in the poet’s biography or in the demi-monde of 
mid-fifteenth-century Paris. Though archæological scholarship has cast some light 
on the Testament’s allusions, for the most part it has not enabled us to identify just 
what is being said.29 We know that the lawyer Jean Cotart, whom the testator 
posthumously characterizes as an alcoholic in a ballade (l. 1238-65), was a corrupt 
and disreputable figure; but the archival records of his misdeeds in the 1450s tell us 
nothing about his attitude to drink. Was he indeed an inveterate boozer? Or was he, 
for all his unreliability, a paragon of sobriety whose reputation is being rewritten for 
some reason? Even if some evidentiary miracle provided us with an answer, a more 
fundamental question would remain: what does it mean for the testator to associate 
Cotart so vividly with wine? Is the ballade an expression of indulgent fellow-
feeling, or a means of settling scores?30 Such interpretative challenges made the 
Testament difficult even for Clément Marot, who edited Villon’s works in 1533. 
Marot might seem an ideal reader of Villon: an inventive manipulator of first-person 
poetic voices, only two generations removed from the poet’s lifetime. Yet he begins 
his edition with the warning that proper understanding of the Lais and Testament 
would require first-hand experience of Villon’s Paris; readers of the 1530s, then, are 
already doomed to ignorance.31 A counsel of despair, perhaps, but one that reveals 
something important about the Testament: it resists the very transmissibility, of 
bequests and also of sense, on which both legal and poetic wills are predicated. The 
retrievability of the testator’s world is problematized not only by his deficient 
memory, but by his mode of expression: he does not supply enough information for 
us to reconstruct his experience. Contingency is once again at stake, for it is all too 
clear that the testator’s experience could have been very different from what we 
construe on the basis of what we know to be insufficient evidence. 
The allusion to the Lais, previously discussed, is just one of a set of elements 
that enhance the Testament’s characteristic resistance to transmissibility: elements 
that represent the transmission of the poem itself as unreliable and constantly 
threatened. The testator doubts the competence of his scribe Firmin (l. 565, 779-
780), and authorizes the probate officer Jean de Calais to amend the entire document 
should he so wish (l. 1844-1859).32 Even if the evanescent Epitaphe and Verset 
survive within the poem – if not in the chapel of Sainte-Avoie for which they are 
                                                
29 The point is powerfully made in Regalado, “Effet de réel”, art. cit. 
30 Varied opinions include Hunt, Villon’s Last Will, op. cit., p. 42; Rychner and Henry, ed. cit, 
II, p. 184; R. Dragonetti, “La Soif de François Villon”, Villon hier et aujourd’hui: Actes du 
Colloque pour le cinq-centième anniversaire de l’impression du Testament de Villon 
(Bibliothèque historique de la ville de Paris, 15-17 décembre 1989), ed. J. Dérens, 
J. Dufournet and M. Freeman, Paris, Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville, 1993, p. 123-136. 
31 Clément Marot, “Prologue”, Œuvres poétiques complètes, ed. G. Defaux, 2 vols, Paris, 
Bordas, 1990-3, II, p. 775-778 ; see Armstrong and Kay, Knowing Poetry, op. cit., p. 177. 





facetiously destined – the entreaty to recite the Verset (“dictes”, l. 1891) is a recipe 
for confusion. The rondeau form of the Verset entails a twofold reprise of the 
poem’s opening lines; however, either one or two lines might be repeated at each 
point. Typically for the period, most witnesses repeat only the first word; one 
manuscript adds “etc.”, while one does not signal the first reprise at all.33 Hence the 
Verset’s written version does not permit its audience to establish the extent of the 
reprise that should be supplied in recitation. Such problems of retrievability 
transcend those that result from inadequate memory and incomplete allusions. Even 
if the testator’s powers of recall were not explicitly faulty, even if his allusions were 
wholly transparent, the repeated references to textual variance would still be 
sufficient to disrupt any notion of documentary value, because they prompt us to 
suspect the connection between the text as we read it and the fictive world of the 
testator. To return once more to the language of contingency, the Testament’s overt 
textual instability means that it both is and is not itself. This quality was already 
familiar to Villon’s contemporaries, for whom variance was inherent in textual 
culture; but it takes on a very particular valency in a poem where transmission is 
both omnipresent and never quite achieved.34 Contingency, indeed, marks not only 
the envisaged reception of this poetic will, but also the fiction of its production. The 
testator’s discourse is constantly marked by digressions and self-interruptions – 
which, among other things, delay the will’s “commancement” (l. 792) by some eight 
hundred lines.35 Hence it is all too clear that the finished product, even before it is 
subjected to the vagaries of transmission, is not the document that the testator 
originally meant to write. In this sense the Testament’s oft-noted concern with 
fortune takes on a new and ontologically much richer value.36 Fortune is more than a 
pervasive theme in the poem, for Aristotle’s Metaphysics defines fortune as an 
accident: that is to say, something that occurs “not as itself but as something 
different”. In Aristotle’s example, a man finds treasure while digging to plant a tree; 
the treasure is encountered not as treasure but as an obstacle to his digging, as 
                                                
33 These manuscripts are respectively Stockholm, Royal Library, MS V.u.22, and Paris, 
Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, ms. 3523. See Rychner and Henry, ed. cit., I, p. 6-15, 143. On the 
vexed issue of the reprise in rondeaux of the period, see D. Poirion, Le Poète et le prince: 
l’évolution du lyrisme courtois de Guillaume de Machaut à Charles d’Orléans, Grenoble, 
Université de Grenoble – Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines, 1965, p. 351-356. 
34 On the poetic implications of variance for Villon’s work, see N. F. Regalado, “Gathering 
the Works: The Œuvres de Villon and the Intergeneric Passage of the Medieval French Lyric 
into Single-Author Collections”, L’Esprit Créateur, 33, 1993, p. 87-100; C. J. Brown, 
“Author, Editor and the Use of Illustrations in the Early Imprints of Villon’s Works: ‘Ung 
chacun n’est maistre du scien’”, Chaucer’s French Contemporaries: The Poetry/Poetics of 
Self and Tradition, ed. R. B. Palmer, pref. V. A. Kramer, New York, AMS, 1999, p. 313-348. 
35 See Hunt, Villon’s Last Will, op. cit., p. 87-96. 
36 On the theme of Fortune, see especially P. Tucci, “Villon e la Fortuna”, Parcours et 
rencontres: mélanges de langue, d’histoire et de littérature françaises offerts à Enea Balmas, 
ed. P. Carile, G. Dotoli, A. M. Raugei, M. Simonin, and L. Zilli, 2 vols, Paris, Klincksieck, 
1993, I, p. 627-648. 
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something that he had not sought to find.37 The Testament presents itself as just this 
kind of accident, as a text other than its fictive author had set out to produce. A text, 
in short, that encapsulates fortune at work. Were the term not overly 
anthropomorphic, we might even claim that the Testament is effectively a 
personification of Fortune. 
 
The modulations of contingency in late medieval poetry 
What connects the insistent particularity and blocked retrievability that I have 
traced throughout the poem, and what gives them a specific value in a legal sense, is 
the way in which they position the testator as a juridical subject.38 This persona is 
clearly deeply imbricated in legal practices and discourses, but he is not susceptible 
of judgement in those terms: the evidence is too shaky, the relationship between case 
and principle too indeterminate. Villon’s resistance to law, then, is not solely a 
matter of biography, conjectural or otherwise; it inheres in the Testament’s very 
texture and preoccupations. At the same time, the more “law-abiding” poetry of 
Villon’s contemporaries and successors can also be fruitfully considered from this 
very general legal perspective. The accessibility of evidence, and the applicability of 
principles to cases, are manifested in intriguingly different forms and combinations. 
The lyrics of Charles d’Orléans, for instance, are characterized by symbolic 
ambiguity and referential opacity: the fictive world of the poetic persona cannot be 
viably retrieved from the available evidence.39 The formally elaborate political 
poetry of the rhétoriqueurs, by contrast, is relatively transparent in referential terms; 
but whereas Charles’s lyrics are instantly recognizable as examples of well-
established forms such as the ballade and rondeau, the sophistication of 
rhétoriqueur compositional technique often endows their work with an ostentatious 
particularity. Many of the most substantial rhétoriqueur pieces, in verse or 
prosimetrum, simply cannot be readily identified as examples of a specific form: an 
umbrella term such as dit is hardly an adequate reference point, and notions of 
family resemblance between these pieces are difficult to sustain in the face of their 
formal and structural diversity.40 Though these bodies of work are only rarely 
concerned with properly legal matters, they manifest contingency in ways that lend 
themselves to comparison with each other and with Villon’s work. Hence 
contingency offers literary historians the possibility of tracing alternative sets of 
relations, between poets and forms that are often considered in isolation from each 
                                                
37 See Heller-Roazen, Fortune’s Faces, op. cit., p. 82-85; the quotation from Aristotle, 
translated from William of Moerbeke’s thirteenth-century Latin version of the Metaphysics, 
appears on p. 83. 
38 For a rather different approach to subject constitution in Villon, see P. Haidu, The Subject 
Medieval/Modern: Text and Governance in the Middle Ages, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 2004, p. 328-340. 
39 R. C. Cholakian, Reflection/Deflection in the Poetry of Charles d’Orléans: A 
Psychosemiotic Reading, Potomac, Scripta Humanistica, 1985, astutely notes these properties 
of Charles’s work. One need not share Cholakian’s psychologizing assumptions to appreciate 
his insights into the poems themselves. 




other. In this respect the Testament takes on a further value: it is a meaningful test 
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